The Crisis IX
Thomas Paine
[Written in Philadelphia, 4 October, 1780]
HAD America pursued her advantages with half the spirit that she
resisted her misfortunes, she would, before now, have been a
conquering and a peaceful people; but lulled in the lap of soft
tranquillity, she rested on her hopes, and adversity only has
convulsed her into action. Whether subtlety or sincerity at the
close of the last year induced the enemy to an appearance for peace,
is a point not material to know; it is sufficient that we see the
effects it has had on our politics, and that we sternly rise to
resent the delusion.
The war, on the part of America, has been a war of natural
feelings. Brave in distress; serene in conquest; drowsy while at
rest; and in every situation generously disposed to peace; a
dangerous calm, and a most heightened zeal have, as circumstances
varied, succeeded each other. Every passion but that of despair has
been called to a tour of duty; and so mistaken has been the enemy,
of our abilities and disposition, that when she supposed us
conquered, we rose the conquerors. The extensiveness of the United
States, and the variety of their resources; the universality of
their cause, the quick operation of their feelings, and the
similarity of their sentiments, have, in every trying situation,
produced a something, which, favored by providence, and pursued with
ardor, has accomplished in an instant the business of a campaign. We
have never deliberately sought victory, but snatched it; and
bravely undone in an hour the blotted operations of a season.
The reported fate of Charleston, like the misfortunes of 1776, has
at last called forth a spirit, and kindled up a flame, which perhaps
no other event could have produced. If the enemy has circulated a
falsehood, they have unwisely aggravated us into life, and if they
have told us the truth, they have unintentionally done us a service.
We were returning with folded arms from the fatigues of war, and
thinking and sitting leisurely down to enjoy repose. The dependence
that has been put upon Charleston threw a drowsiness over America.
We looked on the business done- the conflict over- the matter
settled- or that all which remained unfinished would follow of
itself. In this state of dangerous relaxation, exposed to the
poisonous infusions of the enemy, and having no common danger to
attract our attention, we were extinguishing, by stages, the ardor
we began with, and surrendering by piece-meal the virtue that
defended us.
Afflicting as the loss of Charleston may be, yet if it universally
rouse us from the slumber of twelve months past, and renew in us the
spirit of former days, it will produce an advantage more important
than its loss. America ever is what she thinks herself to be.
Governed by sentiment, and acting her own mind, she becomes, as she
pleases, the victor or the victim.
It is not the conquest of towns, nor the accidental capture of
garrisons, that can reduce a country so extensive as this. The
sufferings of one part can never be relieved by the exertions of
another, and there is no situation the enemy can be placed in that
does not afford to us the same advantages which he seeks himself. By
dividing his force, he leaves every post attackable. It is a mode of
war that carries with it a confession of weakness, and goes on the
principle of distress rather than conquest.
The decline of the enemy is visible, not only in their operations,
but in their plans; Charleston originally made but a secondary
object in the system of attack, and it is now become their principal
one, because they have not been able to succeed elsewhere. It would
have carried a cowardly appearance in Europe had they formed their
grand expedition, in 1776, against a part of the continent where
there was no army, or not a sufficient one to oppose them; but
failing year after year in their impressions here, and to the
eastward and northward, they deserted their capital design, and
prudently contenting themselves with what they can get, give a
flourish of honor to conceal disgrace.
But this piece-meal work is not conquering the continent. It is a
discredit in them to attempt it, and in us to suffer it. It is now
full time to put an end to a war of aggravations, which, on one
side, has no possible object, and on the other has every inducement
which honor, interest, safety and happiness can inspire. If we
suffer them much longer to remain among us, we shall become as bad
as themselves. An association of vice will reduce us more than the
sword. A nation hardened in the practice of iniquity knows better
how to profit by it, than a young country newly corrupted. We are
not a match for them in the line of advantageous guilt, nor they for
us on the principles which we bravely set out with. Our first days
were our days of honor. They have marked the character of America
wherever the story of her wars are told; and convinced of this, we
have nothing to do but wisely and unitedly to tread the well known
track. The progress of a war is often as ruinous to individuals, as
the issue of it is to a nation; and it is not only necessary that
our forces be such that we be conquerors in the end, but that by
timely exertions we be secure in the interim. The present campaign
will afford an opportunity which has never presented itself before,
and the preparations for it are equally necessary, whether
Charleston stand or fall. Suppose the first, it is in that case only
a failure of the enemy, not a defeat. All the conquest that a
besieged town can hope for, is, not to be conquered; and compelling
an enemy to raise the siege, is to the besieged a victory. But there
must be a probability amounting almost to a certainty, that would
justify a garrison marching out to attack a retreat. Therefore
should Charleston not be taken, and the enemy abandon the siege,
every other part of the continent should prepare to meet them; and,
on the contrary, should it be taken, the same preparations are
necessary to balance the loss, and put ourselves in a position to
co-operate with our allies, immediately on their arrival.
We are not now fighting our battles alone, as we were in 1776;
England, from a malicious disposition to America, has not only not
declared war against France and Spain, but, the better to prosecute
her passions here, has afforded those powers no military object, and
avoids them, to distress us. She will suffer her West India islands
to be overrun by France, and her southern settlements to be taken by
Spain, rather than quit the object that gratifies her revenge. This
conduct, on the part of Britain, has pointed out the propriety of
France sending a naval and land force to co-operate with America on
the spot. Their arrival cannot be very distant, nor the ravages of
the enemy long. The recruiting the army, and procuring the supplies,
are the two things most necessary to be accomplished, and a capture
of either of the enemy's divisions will restore to America peace and
plenty.
At a crisis, big, like the present, with expectation and events,
the whole country is called to unanimity and exertion. Not an
ability ought now to sleep, that can produce but a mite to the
general good, nor even a whisper to pass that militates against it.
The necessity of the case, and the importance of the consequences,
admit no delay from a friend, no apology from an enemy. To spare
now, would be the height of extravagance, and to consult present
ease, would be to sacrifice it perhaps forever.
America, rich in patriotism and produce, can want neither men nor
supplies, when a serious necessity calls them forth. The slow
operation of taxes, owing to the extensiveness of collection, and
their depreciated value before they arrived in the treasury, have,
in many instances, thrown a burden upon government, which has been
artfully interpreted by the enemy into a general decline throughout
the country. Yet this, inconvenient as it may at first appear, is
not only remediable, but may be turned to an immediate advantage;
for it makes no real difference, whether a certain number of men, or
company of militia (and in this country every man is a militia-man),
are directed by law to send a recruit at their own expense, or
whether a tax is laid on them for that purpose, and the man hired by
government afterwards. The first, if there is any difference, is
both cheapest and best, because it saves the expense which would
attend collecting it as a tax, and brings the man sooner into the
field than the modes of recruiting formerly used; and, on this
principle, a law has been passed in this state, for recruiting two
men from each company of militia, which will add upwards of a
thousand to the force of the country.
But the flame which has broken forth in this city since the report
from New York, of the loss of Charleston, not only does honor to the
place, but, like the blaze of 1776, will kindle into action the
scattered sparks throughout America. The valor of a country may be
learned by the bravery of its soldiery, and the general cast of its
inhabitants, but confidence of success is best discovered by the
active measures pursued by men of property; and when the spirit of
enterprise becomes so universal as to act at once on all ranks of
men, a war may then, and not till then, be styled truly popular.
In 1776, the ardor of the enterprising part was considerably
checked by the real revolt of some, and the coolness of others. But
in the present case, there is a firmness in the substance and
property of the country to the public cause. An association has been
entered into by the merchants, tradesmen, and principal inhabitants
of the city [Philadelphia], to receive and support the new state
money at the value of gold and silver; a measure which, while it
does them honor, will likewise contribute to their interest, by
rendering the operations of the campaign convenient and effectual.
Nor has the spirit of exertion stopped here. A voluntary
subscription is likewise begun, to raise a fund of hard money, to be
given as bounties, to fill up the full quota of the Pennsylvania
line. It has been the remark of the enemy, that every thing in
America has been done by the force of government; but when she sees
individuals throwing in their voluntary aid, and facilitating the
public measures in concert with the established powers of the
country, it will convince her that the cause of America stands not
on the will of a few but on the broad foundation of property and
popularity.
Thus aided and thus supported, disaffection will decline, and the
withered head of tyranny expire in America. The ravages of the enemy
will be short and limited, and like all their former ones, will
produce a victory over themselves. -- COMMON SENSE. P. S. At the
time of writing this number of the Crisis, the loss of Charleston,
though believed by some, was more confidently disbelieved by others.
But there ought to be no longer a doubt upon the matter. Charleston
is gone, and I believe for the want of a sufficient supply of
provisions. The man that does not now feel for the honor of the best
and noblest cause that ever a country engaged in, and exert himself
accordingly, is no longer worthy of a peaceable residence among a
people determined to be free.
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